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ABSTRACT
One of the big problems of risk assessment in information
security is the quantification of risk-related properties, such
as vulnerability. Vulnerability expresses the likelihood that
a threat agent acting against an asset will cause impact, for
example, the likelihood that an attacker will be able to crack
a password or break into a system. This likelihood depends
on the capabilities of the threat agent and the strength of
the controls in place. In this paper, we provide a framework
for estimating these three variables based on the Elo rating
used for chess players. This framework re-interprets secu-
rity from the field of Item Response Theory. By observing
the success of threat agents against assets, one can rate the
strength of threats and controls, and predict the vulnerabil-
ity of systems to particular threats. The application of Item
Response Theory to the field of risk is new, but analogous
to its application to children solving math problems. It pro-
vides an innovative and sound way to quantify vulnerability
in models of (information) security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
General Terms
Management, Measurement, Security
Keywords
control strength, Elo, Item Response Theory, rating systems,
risk assessment, security metrics, threat capability, vulner-
ability
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
One of the big problems of risk assessment in information
security is the quantification of risk-related properties, such
as the expected frequency of threat events, vulnerability of
a system to such events, and impact on the system. In
this research area, the goal is not finding new threats or
attack scenarios (which is another big problem), but rather
quantifying the risk of known ones. Simply counting incident
numbers is not very adequate though, especially if they are
self-reported [12]. Therefore, we need more detailed models
of what constitutes a risk and how much damage to expect
from it [22].
Among the different components of risk, the notion of
vulnerability is particularly problematic. There are at least
three issues with the use of the term:
1. The term is used in both countable and uncountable
forms, to express two different things:
(a) A particular security weakness in a system design:
“This software has two buffer overflow vulnerabil-
ities”, or
(b) The ease with which a system can be damaged by
threats: “This system has a higher vulnerability
than that one”;
2. If we assume the second meaning, it is unclear how to
define the vulnerability (level) of a system to a partic-
ular threat;
3. Even if we know the vulnerability levels of a system to
specific threats, it is unclear how to define an aggregate
vulnerability level of a system, to provide justification
for the statement that one system is more vulnerable
than another.
In this paper, we deal with the second problem, namely
the definition of the level of vulnerability of a system with
respect to a particular threat. This means that we will use
vulnerability in the uncountable sense, i.e., the ease with
which damage is caused by a threat. The solution we envi-
sion is based on the psychometric approach of Item Response
Theory, related to the widely known Elo ratings used to rank
chess players.
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1.2 Ingredients
To define our concepts, we use the risk definitions pro-
vided by The Open Group [15]. They assume the existence
of “threat agents” in the environment of a system that may
cause damage to system assets. According to The Open
Group, vulnerability expresses the likelihood that a threat
agent acting against an asset will cause impact. Vulnerabil-
ity is based on the “skills” of the threat (Threat Capability)
and the “skills” of the defender (Control Strength).
Thus, in a non-malicious context, a storm with a certain
wind speed will have a certain likelihood of causing a power
line breakdown. This likelihood will increase with the wind
speed. On the other hand, different power lines will have dif-
ferent resistance against storms, and the likelihood of break-
down will decrease with the resistance.
There are three variables involved here: wind speed, re-
sistance, and breakdown. For each particular case of the
threat agent storm acting against the asset power line, we
may be able to obtain certain information. In particular, we
may know the wind speed, the type of power line, and/or
whether the “attack” results in a breakdown or not. For
malicious threats, we may know the attacker capability, the
type of system, and/or the “success” of an attack. Given
this information, we would like to predict the likelihood of
breakdown for future events (i.e., the vulnerability). How
to do this?
In a very similar setting, we have the following problem.
We have a population of children who attempt so solve in-
stances from a population of math problems. Initially we
may know neither the capability of the children nor the dif-
ficulty of the problems. Can we, based on observing which
children are able to solve which problems, determine the
children’s capabilities, and the difficulty of the problems? If
we can, then we can also predict the success of a particu-
lar child in solving a particular (previously unencountered)
problem.
Klinkenberg, Straatemeier, and Van der Maas [19] devel-
oped just such a system for math problems, called Math
Garden, which is based on the Elo rating. The Elo rating
was originally conceived to rank players in chess [8], but is
now also regularly applied outside the chess domain [9, 10].
Each player has a rating that can be used to estimate the ex-
pected outcome of a particular match between two players.
This rating is updated after each match: players’ ratings
increase if they win, and decrease if they lose. The rating
increases more if they win against a highly ranked player.
When applied to math problems, Elo works analogously, al-
though we now have two different types of entities: children
and problems. If a child solves a problem, the rating of the
child increases and that of the problem decreases. If a child
fails, the rating of the child decreases and that of the prob-
lem increases. This particular setting is covered by the field
of Item Response Theory.
1.3 The New Paradigm
In this paper, we investigate how a similar paradigm might
work in a security context, where threat agents“play”against
systems. We thus redefine vulnerability metrics as a special
application area of Item Response Theory. We study to
what extent a rating system can be used for estimating (a)
capability of a threat, (b) strength of a control (resistance),
and (c) vulnerability, i.e., the likelihood that a particular
threat is successful against a particular asset. This provides
a method for estimating vulnerability, as a component of
quantification of risk. Besides, the Elo approach has the ad-
vantage that it also yields ratings of the different threat and
control types, which will give information about the vulnera-
bility of other assets to the same threat, or the vulnerability
of the same asset to other threats.
1.4 Paper Outline
In Section 2, we discuss related work, including the use
of Elo style ratings as well as information security mod-
els. In Section 3, we provide the definitions of our concepts,
based on the Risk Taxonomy of The Open Group [15]. In
Section 4, we define the relation between threat capability,
control strength, and vulnerability. In Section 5, we discuss
how to use this model to estimate relevant variables in a risk
context. In Section 6, we investigate the necessary infras-
tructure to support such applications. We end with open
questions in Section 7 and conclusions in Section 8.
2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Rating Systems
To enable the quantification of vulnerability, threat capa-
bility, and control strength, we make use of existing rating
systems. Several existing rating systems enable rating of the
capabilities of entities, and we will discuss their properties in
this section. Throughout the section, we use θ to represent
a rating where both entities have the same type, e.g., the
Elo system for chess players. When the entities have two
(different) types, we use δ for the difficulty of the problem
or asset and β for the ability of the solver or the attacker.
This may not match the notation in the original papers.
Furthermore, the outcome of a “match” between two en-
tities is 1 for the entity that “wins”, 0 for the entity that
“loses”, and 0.5 for each in case of a “draw”. Other possible
outcome scales will be discussed later.
A central assumption of the rating systems discussed is the
following: if the ratings of two entities are equal, then the
expected result is 0.5 for each of them. If there is no draw
option (the outcome is always 0 or 1), then we can state
equivalently that the likelihood of winning is 0.5, when the
ratings of the entities are equal.
2.1.1 One Type, Dynamic Rating: The Elo System
The Elo Rating System [8] is used for rating players in
chess. The system consists of two independent sets of equa-
tions. The first set of equations is the update rule: after a
match between two players, the ratings of these players are
updated, based on the discrepancy between the expected
outcome and the observed outcome of the match.
The new ratings θˆ of two players i, j with ratings θ after a
match with result S for each player (0 for lose, 0.5 for draw
and 1 for win) are calculated as follows:
θˆi = θi +K · (Si − E(Si)) (1)
θˆj = θj +K · (Sj − E(Sj)) (2)
In these equations, the factor K reflects uncertainty, or
how quickly the rating should change, based on the results
of a single match. New players enter the system with a
default rating, and if K is too low, it takes a long time
before they reach their true rating. On the other hand, if
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K is too high, the system is unstable: ratings fluctuate too
much. The optimal value for K is found empirically, which
can be done in different ways. Also, new players need to be
assigned provisional ratings. In chess, K decreases with the
number of matches played and the strength of a player.
The expected outcome for player i in a match against
player j can be expressed as:
E(Si) =
1
1 + 10(θj−θi)/S
(3)
The factor S determines the scale of the rating and is set
to 400 in chess. Also note that equations (1) and (2), the
updating equations, are independent of equation (3), the
expected results equation. This means that if desired, the
expected match result can also be obtained in a different
way while maintaining the rating updating system. This is
done in Math Garden, as also shown later in this paper [19].
2.1.2 Two Types, Static Rating: Rasch Analysis
In the original Elo Rating System, we have one type of
entity, namely chess players. In other settings, often two
types of entities play a role, for example when persons solve
problems. In such a setting, one would like to establish both
the ability rating of the persons and the difficulty rating of
the problems. This is the field of Item Response Theory
(IRT), often used for the construction of aptitude tests.
The probability of the participant producing a correct an-
swer to a problem depends jointly on the ability of the par-
ticipant and the difficulty of the problem. This probabil-
ity is described by a logistic model. The simplest model
is the Rasch model, or one parameter logistic model (1PL
model) [32]. The mathematical form of the Rasch model is
as follows, with δi being the item difficulty, βj the person
ability, and Sij the success of person j against item i, where
1 means solved and 0 means failed:
P (Sij = 1) =
eβj−δi
1 + eβj−δi
=
1
1 + eδi−βj
(4)
Note that the probability of obtaining a correct response
is conceptually very similar to the expected outcome of a
match in the Elo system. The curves produced by the func-
tions are also quite similar, although the Rasch formula uses
e rather than 10 as exponentiation base. This choice is
rather arbitrary. For a detailed comparison of the Elo and
Rasch systems, see [36].
IRT test construction starts with a calibration phrase. A
large set of problems is administered to a large number of
participants. This enables the simultaneous estimation of
both the difficulty ratings of the problems in the set and
the ability ratings of the participants. After the calibra-
tion phase, a selected subset of items in the desired dif-
ficulty range can be administered to a participant of un-
known ability. The more items the participant solves, the
more precisely their ability can be estimated. In the model,
it is assumed that there is a latent trait, with corresponding
quantitative scale, which is measured by the tests under con-
sideration. This scale is thus not predefined, but it emerges
as a result of fitting the Rasch model to the data.
An advantage of this approach is that two participants
can solve different problems from the set, e.g., a young child
solves only easy problems and an older child solves only more
difficult problems, but nevertheless, their ability ratings are
on the same scale. When test administration takes place on
a computer, the items can even be selected based on previ-
ous answers, so the participant only receives items that are
tailored to their ability. The fact that items must first be
calibrated is a limitation of the IRT approach. Calibration
is a costly, time-consuming procedure and it prevents items
from being added or changed after calibration, as their dif-
ficulty rating will not be available or accurate in that case.
2.1.3 Two Types, Dynamic Rating: Math Garden
The Math Garden project [19] circumvents this problem
by combining the IRT approach with the Elo updating rule.
The Math Garden provides an online platform where chil-
dren can solve math problems. In this system, both children
and problems can be added on the fly. All children and prob-
lems that are new to the model obtain a preliminary first
rating, based on superficial characteristics (age for children,
rough estimation of the difficulty for the items). When child
j solves problem i, the Rasch model is used to estimate the
probability of a correct answer. After the problem is solved,
the Elo updating rule is applied to adjust the rating of both
the child and the problem: if the answer is correct the child
“wins”, and if the answer is incorrect the problem “wins”. In
this way, newly added items are calibrated “automatically”
by the update rules.
For calculation of the expected outcome Sij of child j
solving problem i, the Rasch rather than the Elo formula is
used (with e as exponentiation base). This is combined with
the following Elo update rules (same notation as above):
δˆi = δi +Ki · (E(Sij)− Sij) (5)
βˆj = βj +Kj · (Sij − E(Sij)) (6)
The factors K again reflect the uncertainty in the ratings,
to adjust the update speed. New items or persons with few
results should converge quickly, whereas a single unexpected
outcome for items or persons with many results should not
affect the rating too much. In Math Garden, K increases
when a player consistently scores below or above the ex-
pected outcome.
Furthermore, for computing the final ranking the response
time is included as a factor, leading to additional adapta-
tions. For details, we refer to [19].
2.2 Security Risk Models
In this paper, we apply the Math Garden approach to vul-
nerability quantification in risk assessment. The final aim
is to extend traditional risk analysis with quantitative fre-
quency and likelihood values representing risk-related prop-
erties. Several models for risk assessment have been pro-
posed, in which such quantification would be of value. We
will not mention all, but focus on a few that are model-based
and deal with a security context.
CORAS [24] provides risk assessment based on UML di-
agrams. SAVEly [3], Exasym [30], Portunes [7], MsAMS
[27] and ANKH [29] are graph-based security models. In
addition, Portunes and Exasym annotate the nodes with
processes. These approaches can be used to generate at-
tack trees [25, 34], representing possible (multi-step) attack
paths in the system. Nodes in attack trees can be annotated
with quantitative properties, but so far the models have ad-
dressed attack possibilities only qualitatively. Such trees
can also be augmented with countermeasures, as is done in
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attack-defence trees [20] and semantic threat graphs [13].
Also, argumentation-based approaches have been proposed
to reason about security [33]. The explicit relation between
threats and countermeasures in such models makes them
ideally suited to include information on threat capability,
control strength, and vulnerability, as defined in the present
work. The results presented in this paper will contribute to
making such models suitable for quantitative security risk
analysis, by providing the likelihood of success of steps in
the attacks.
In terms of vulnerability quantification, existing work in-
cludes the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
[26], which quantifies the severity of vulnerabilities in the
sense of particular software weaknesses. Also, quantifica-
tion of the level of such vulnerabilities has been attempted
from the economic angle, assigning a market value to specific
vulnerabilities [1, 4]. Here, we are interested in the quan-
tification of the vulnerability, in the uncountable sense, of
a system as a whole, based on measures of the strength of
adversary and control. Using adversary strength as a secu-
rity metric has been discussed before in the valuable notion
of “weakest successful adversary” [28]. This is an abstract
measure of adversary strength, meant to quantify system
security, rather than the concrete ratings we propose here.
Vulnerability measurements can be done by means of pen-
etration testing, as we will discuss later. With respect to
penetration testing for security assessment, also economics
have been addressed, in the sense of optimal penetration
testing strategies [5]. Furthermore, economic approaches
have been applied to optimal patching strategies [17, 37].
Such economic considerations could inspire future work on
strategies to employ the Elo-style ratings in practice, by re-
lating data quality to costs, as well as by relating patching
strategies to rating improvement.
2.3 Expert Risk Judgement
In security, the use of Rasch-type models has been pro-
posed to make expert risk judgement more objective [11].
In this setup, different experts would rate the risk associ-
ated with different threats (e.g., in terms of frequency and
impact), and from this analysis, both the “risk bias” of the
experts (risk-taking or risk-averse) and the “objective risk”
of the threats would be determined. This is indeed a very
interesting idea, and it would merit more attention in the se-
curity community. Here, we are concerned with capabilities
of threats, strengths of controls, and the associated vulner-
ability levels, so we are completely on the “objective” side
of the above distinction. However, it could be valuable to
combine both approaches in future work.
3. DEFINITIONS
In order to enable quantification of security properties,
they first need to be defined precisely, which is a challenge
in itself. Several definitions are possible, depending on stan-
dards and references chosen, and definitely also on the goal
of the analysis.
Part of the inspiration for this research stems from the
Risk Taxonomy of The Open Group [15]. We found this
taxonomy particularly valuable, because it makes an explicit
distinction between threat events and loss events, and asso-
ciated frequencies. In this taxonomy, risk-related variables
are defined starting from the notions of assets and threat
agents acting against these assets, potentially causing dam-
age. A threat event occurs when a threat agent acts against
an asset, and a loss event occurs when this causes damage.
For example, a storm may occur at the location of a power
line (threat event), and this may or may not damage the
power line (loss event).
Like many other approaches, The Open Group distin-
guishes between what they call Loss Event Frequency (LEF)
and Probable Loss Magnitude (PLM).1 The former repre-
sents the expected number of loss events of a particular type
per unit of time, and the latter represents the expected dam-
age per loss event of that type. Risk can be seen as expected
damage due to a certain type of loss event within a given
time frame, and it can then be calculated as LEF · PLM.
Within LEF and PLM, The Open Group makes further
distinctions. We will not discuss those of PLM here, but
focus on LEF. First of all, the Loss Event Frequency can be
separated in Threat Event Frequency (TEF) and Vulnerabil-
ity (V). TEF denotes the expected frequency of occurrence
of a particular threat (seen as a threat agent acting against
an asset; a storm at the location of a power line), and V
specifies the likelihood of the threat inflicting damage upon
the asset. The value for LEF can then be calculated as TEF
· V.
Thus, if a threat event is expected to occur 4 times in
10 years (TEF = 0.4 y−1), and one in two threat events
is expected to cause loss (V = 0.5), then 2 loss events are
expected to occur in 10 years (LEF = TEF · V = 0.4 y−1 ·
0.5 = 0.2 y−1). If the expected damage per threat event is
e 1000 (PLM), then the risk run due to this threat amounts
to e 200 per year (R = LEF · PLM = 0.2 y−1· e 1000 = e
200 y−1), or e 2000 in 10 years.
Now comes the interesting observation in relation to Rasch
and Elo systems:
The Open Group defines the Vulnerability V based
on Threat Capability (TC) and Control Strength
(CS).
In this definition, TC denotes some ability measure of the
threat agent, and CS a resistance (or difficulty of passing)
estimate of the control. In the storm/power line example,
TC would be a value related to wind speed, and CS would
be a value related to the strength of a power line.
Unfortunately, the relation between TC, CS, and V as de-
fined by The Open Group seems rather problematic. Firstly,
although they do not specify it explicitly, they seem to re-
gard TC and CS as percentages. But percentages of what?
The standard seems to assume a probability distribution of
TC over all the threat agents, but this is something differ-
ent than representing the TC of a particular threat agent
as a probability. One can say that there is a probability
distribution of wind speed, with the most powerful winds
only occurring rarely, but it does not make sense to asso-
ciate a probability value with the wind speed of a particular
storm, or even a “threat community” of storms.2 Further-
1These variables are often called likelihood (probability) and
impact, but (expected) frequency is indeed more accurate
than likelihood. A likelihood or probability is always a num-
ber between 0 and 1. If one considers a specified time frame,
say 10 years, one is not interested in the probability of occur-
rence of a certain event (e.g., 0.9), but rather in the expected
number of occurrences (e.g., 4). Only the latter allows cal-
culation of the expected damage.
2Unless one means a percentile or cumulative probability,
stating that 90% of the storms would be weaker than this
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more, they then seem to calculate V as TC - CS, with the
example 90% − 80% = 10%. This could be interpreted as
a threat agent with TC 90% having 10% probability of in-
flicting damage upon an asset with CS 80%. Even if per-
centages would be the right way to express TC and CS, this
seems plainly wrong, as probabilities of events cannot be
subtracted to obtain the probability of another event.
Fortunately, there is another way to represent TC, CS,
and V, which yields a meaningful relation both in mathe-
matical and in practical sense. The key observation is that
the notions of TC and CS seem to fit extremely well in the
Elo and Rasch type models, where – as discussed above – TC
corresponds to a person’s ability to solve problems, and CS
corresponds to the difficulty of a problem. A threat agent
acting against an asset thus corresponds to a child solving a
math problem. As models already exist for the latter case,
we can provide an accurate definition of the relation between
TC, CS, and V by employing similar models.
4. EXPRESSING VULNERABILITY
Our goal is thus to represent threat capability, control
strength, and vulnerability in a mathematical model, anal-
ogous to the Rasch and Elo approaches for children solving
math problems. The difference between threat capability
and control strength then determines the probability of suc-
cess, i.e., the probability of the threat agent inflicting dam-
age upon the asset.
Note that our approach has general applicability, as it
is based on data (observed outcomes) only. A single vari-
able per entity is assumed to explain the observed variation
(i.e., threat capability / control strength). When underly-
ing physical, psychic or social mechanisms are known, more
precise models, with additional variables, may be developed
for specific cases (e.g., wind and power lines). However, the
goal here is a general model that can be used for any type
of threat.
Typically, for a given threat capability, the probability of
success will first decrease slowly with the control strength.
Where the control strength is close to the threat capability,
the curve will drop steeply, after which it will start to de-
crease slowly again. The inverse behaviour will be seen for
the probability of success with a fixed control strength, with
increasing threat capability. Here, there will be a sharp in-
crease where threat capability and control strength are close.
In the math problems case, children with low capability are
very unlikely to solve difficult problems, but the probability
increases sharply where capability and difficulty are almost
equal.
This can be expressed in the logistic formula of the Rasch
model (one parameter, or 1PL). The relation between threat
capability βj , control strength δi, and success Sij can be
expressed as follows (same as Equation 4):
P (Sij = 1) =
eβj−δi
1 + eβj−δi
(7)
Examples of the 1PL model are shown in Figure 1. The
curves show the probability P (Sij = 1) corresponding to the
capability βj , where each curve corresponds to a different
value of δi.
one. This would make more sense, but it does not help
in expressing vulnerability as the difference between threat
capability and control strength.
Figure 1: A one-parameter logistic function.
Instead of the one parameter logistic Rasch model (1PL)
a two-parameter model (2PL) can also be used [2]. One
can then express the discrimination of problems / controls,
i.e., how well they can distinguish between persons / threats
of different capability. When the success probability is dis-
played against the threat capability for a specific control,
this corresponds to the maximum slope of the curve. With
additional parameter α, indicating the slope of the curve,
the formula becomes:
P (Sij = 1) =
e(βj−δi)αi
1 + e(βj−δi)αi
(8)
The 2PL model is more expressive, in the sense that it
can adequately represent items / controls with different dis-
criminatory value, but the fitting of the model to the data
becomes more complex.
A third parameter can be added to represent bias in the
probability, for example in case of multiple choice questions
with guessing bias. In that case, the lower asymptote would
become higher than zero. The issue of “luck” or guessing
might be relevant in security, although it would be harder
to define its exact value. Also, one might want to consider
a bias on the upper side of the graph, when even the best
threat agents would have some fixed probability of failing.
Typically, when using such models in a problem-solving
context, one will observe the success of certain persons play-
ing against certain problems, and thereby estimate the pa-
rameters of the problems (δi, and in case of the 2PL model
αi), and the ability of the persons (βj). This will then al-
low the prediction of the success of a person on a problem
she has not encountered before. It will also allow the esti-
mation of the ability of an unknown person, based on any
set of administered problems (once calibrated). For threats
and controls, a similar analysis may be employed based on
known incidents.
When we use dynamic ratings, like in the Elo chess rating
and in the Math Garden approach, we can define update
rules that we apply when events occur (see Equations (5)
and (6)). New threats and controls can then be added to
the system on the fly, without requiring a new calibration
phase. As new security risks emerge quite often, this is an
important feature in a risk management context. Again,
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the update rate K may be adjusted, such that fast updating
occurs for new threats and controls, and slow updating for
known threats and controls.
The mathematical translation from Item Response Theory
to risk management is thus rather straightforward. Based
on measured events, both threats and systems are rated on
the latent ability scale. This will then allow us to predict
the likelihood of a threat causing damage to a system in the
future (the vulnerability). However, in a practical sense,
it is not always clear how to define threats, systems and
events. It is in particular this problem that we face in the
application, and we will discuss it in more detail in the next
section.
5. APPLICATION
We are now ready to apply the rating to different kinds
of threats. Threats can be classified based on a number of
dimensions or properties, for example, whether a threat is
observable or not, malicious or benign, or preventable or
not. Some of these dimensions may be orthogonal, for ex-
ample observability and maliciousness. We believe that an
exploration of threat dimensions will help in understanding
and mitigating threats. For this article we focus on ma-
liciousness, and we distinguish between non-malicious and
malicious threats. We finally consider the application of our
techniques to (vulnerabilities of) software products.
5.1 Non-Malicious Threats
As an example of a non-malicious threat, we consider the
threat of storms to power lines. In this case, the threat capa-
bility is related to the wind speed, and the control strength
to the construction quality of the lines. We distinguish two
main questions for this application case:
1. What is the role of existing threat capability scales,
e.g., wind speed?
2. How to determine the relevant population or set of
entities: which storms are the“same”storm, and which
power lines are the “same” power lines?
The answer to the first problem is relatively straightfor-
ward: the constraints of the model will define the scales of
threat capability and control strength from the data, as la-
tent traits. Based on the results, one could then reconstruct
the relation between the emergent threat capability scale
and, say, the wind speed in km/h. It is, however, neither
necessary nor sufficient to have a predefined threat capabil-
ity scale.
For the second question, the issue at stake is how to define
the population that the rating will apply to. In the context
of children against math problems, the populations are al-
ready well-defined, and it is clear when the same child is
solving a different problem (apart from technical issues of
authentication and shared accounts).
But in the threat context, are we speaking about storms
against power lines, attackers against organisations, or na-
tion states against nation states? For each of these cases,
what exactly do we rate? Do we rate individual storms /
individual people, or classes of storms / organisations that
people are members of? This gives rise to the notion of levels
of abstraction, which we will come back to in the malicious
case. Different levels of abstraction could be used simulta-
neously: one can rate both organisations and people, but
the rating of the organisation and the ratings of its mem-
bers will be related. In most cases, choosing a single level
of abstraction suffices. Thus, one will either rate individual
instances, or groups.
The population does not need to be homogeneous, in the
sense that the entities have similar properties. As with chess
players or school children, the entities may have different
backgrounds (or designs), and the model will automatically
place the entities along the assumed single latent scale. How-
ever, there should be a reasonable assumption that a single
scale is meaningful, and that there are no interfering vari-
ables. Also, there should be enough data available on the
chosen level of abstraction. As a storm occurs only once, it
is probably not a good idea to rate individual storms.
In the context of storms and power lines, the easiest solu-
tion for defining the population is grouping entities in dis-
tinct classes, and then updating the rating of the classes
instead of the entities. For grouping the entities, prede-
fined capability scales can be useful. One can then, say, use
the Beaufort or Hurricane scales for wind speed, considering
storms of the same class as identical for analysis purposes.
However, this means that arbitrary boundaries between
classes would influence the results. For example, the Beau-
fort scale would put certain storms in class 9 and others in
10, but a storm high in class 9 is very close to a storm low
in class 10. For accuracy, one would rather not lose infor-
mation by grouping entities like this. When threat agents or
controls are not identical but similar, a different strategy is
needed. A potential solution is associating the rating with
a representative instance of the class (e.g., the mean wind
speed for Beaufort 9). If a storm occurs with wind speed
somewhere between the representative instances of class 9
and 10, one would then update the ratings of both repre-
sentative instances, with update speed proportional to the
closeness to the actual wind speed.
Another solution would also use a similarity measure be-
tween entities to determine the update speed, but now all
entities would be rated instead of representative instances
of a class. If a storm destroys a power line, one would then
not only update the rating of this storm and this power line,
but also those of storms and power lines that are “close” on
the similarity scale. The less similar, the lower the update
factor. For the similarity measures, both predefined scales
(wind speed in km/h) or the emergent Threat Capability
scale could be used. Additional research is needed to un-
cover advantages and disadvantages of these three methods,
in combination with tailored simulations or case studies.
Obviously, these considerations apply not only to threat
events, but also to controls. Just as it is required to define
when two threat events correspond to the same threat, we
need to define when two threat events act upon the same
control. Again, pre-defined classes can be used (same man-
ufacturing type of a component, same operating system on
a computer, etc.). The granularity of such classifications
needs to be determined based on the requirements of the
case. With large classes, there will be more data per class,
but the precision is lower. With small classes, the theoret-
ical precision is higher, but there may not be enough data
to support the model.
5.2 Malicious Threats
On the side of malicious attacks, there is typically a hu-
man attacker that aims to compromise the security of an
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asset or organisation. In an attack on information tech-
nology infrastructure, we have an attacker with a certain
knowledge and capability, representing the threat to the or-
ganisation and consequently being measured by the threat
capability. The control strength then is a measure for the
organisation’s capability to repel the attack, be it in form of
policies or physical countermeasures. Again, we assume the
relevant attack scenarios to be known here; identifying such
scenarios is a different area of interest.
This kind of setting poses several challenges for the Elo
rating system. Most notably, neither successful attacks nor
successful defences are always reported or easy to detect.
This difficulty can be avoided in penetration testing, where
organisations systematically investigate the opportunities for
attack. The foremost goal is to test shortcomings of security
precautions and to report and document them. These tests
may include benevolent attempts to gain access to physical
as well as digital property, and may include manipulation
of people, i.e., social engineering. Based on the outcomes of
such tests, one can then try to measure the control strength
of different measures, such as technical properties, detection
mechanisms, and employee education.
Also, the “attackers” are known in penetration testing,
whereas real attackers often remain hidden. Thirdly, pen-
etration tests will generate knowledge on failed attempts,
whereas we may not know how many failed attempts real
attackers initiated before they finally succeed. Finally, a
controlled setting makes it possible to select the attackers
and systems that play against each other, maximising the
games for optimal information (like selecting math prob-
lems appropriate to children’s skill levels). These advantages
are not limited to the penetration testing setting. A simi-
lar constellation is found when considering, e.g., compliance
testing, certification, and accreditation of organisations or
individuals with respect to standards.
The semantics of an Elo-score for penetration testing is a
valuation of both the penetration tester and the tested or-
ganisation. This should not (and actually can not) replace
standard procedures, such as patching detected vulnerabili-
ties. The proposed Elo-scores based method allows judging
the threat capability (of the tester) and the control strength
of the organisation for use in risk assessment; it is not a
preventive measure.
In applying our ranking approach, we consider three dif-
ferent scenarios. In the first, penetration testers play against
organisations. In this scenario we can judge an individual
tester’s ability to find holes in a defence, and how good or-
ganisations are in plugging these holes. In the second sce-
nario, regulations or standards play against organisations.
In this scenario we can assess the difficulty of regulations,
and organisations’ ability to comply with these. Finally, in
the third scenario, software products are rated according to
their response to bugs. All three scenarios could be used
to, for example, implement seal mechanisms for auditing of
services [31].
5.2.1 Testers Against Organisations
To begin, we consider the person performing a penetra-
tion test as the threat, and the tested organisation as the
asset. In this scenario, the threat capability is related to the
tester’s ability to unveil shortcomings in the organisation’s
defence, and the control strength is related to the organisa-
tion’s ability to defend its assets.
Figure 2: Different levels of granularity for the pen-
etration test example. When moving from finer to
coarser levels, the coarser level subsumes results
from the finer elements. That is, an auditing com-
pany wins whenever, for example, a specific pene-
tration test succeeds.
As in the ranking systems discussed in Section 2.1, testers
and organisations start at a common initial rating. Every
time a test is performed, its result is used for determining
the new rankings of both parties. A successful penetration,
i.e. when the target asset of the test is reached, counts as a
win for the tester; an unsuccessful penetration counts as a
win for the organisation.
By applying the ranking to testers and organisations we
measure the tester’s skill and the effectiveness of the organ-
isation’s protective measures. Testers can most likely get a
sufficient number of games by performing penetration tests;
organisations will probably only perform a limited number
of penetration tests, which might be problematic to obtain
meaningful numbers.
As before we face the issue of granularity. For both par-
ties involved we can perform the games on different lev-
els (see Figure 2). On the testing side the coarsest level
would be that of the regulation being tested, and the finest
that of an individual test performed. On the organisational
side, the coarsest level is the organisation itself, while the
finest level, depending on the kind of test, is the subsystem
or employee being tested. One could imagine to choose even
finer levels, such as different types of skills of the tester, or
properties of the unit being tested, but it is questionable
what could be gained from this.
When moving from finer to coarser levels of granularity,
the coarser level subsumes results from the finer elements.
This means that the results of any finer level are counted as
the result for the coarser level, that is, for example, that an
auditing company wins whenever a specific penetration test
succeeds. In this way, a single event can cause updates of
abilities at various levels.
5.2.2 Regulations Against Organisations
In the second case we consider organisations being certi-
fied in relation to some standard or regulation. In this case,
the control strength is still related to the organisation, but
now it measures its ability to implement a (part of the) reg-
ulation correctly, so it refers to the compliance capabilities
of the organisation. The threat capability (interpreted as
regulation difficulty) is now measured at the level of regu-
lations (or parts thereof), removing the auditing company
and its auditors from the equation (Figure 3). A win of the
organisations in this case means that a (part of the) regu-
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Figure 3: Different levels of granularity for the certi-
fication example. As before, coarser levels subsume
results from the finer elements.
lation is implemented correctly (auditor finds no problems),
whereas a win of the regulation means that it is not (auditor
does find problems).
As explained above, the testers (auditors) now play on be-
half of the regulation. This means that in the ranking each
win of the auditor is counted as a win of the regulation.
It is thus “regulation difficulty” rather than “tester ability”
that is measured. Similar abstractions can of course be per-
formed on the side of the organisation, e.g., playing and
measuring on the country level, but that seems less natural
when considering certification, where the question of inter-
est is whether or not an organisation implements a certain
standard or not.
It is interesting to consider what is measured in this set-
ting. From the viewpoint of the asset, the organisation, not
too much has changed; the resulting rank should still be
read as effectiveness in fulfilling a certain regulation. From
the viewpoint of the threat we now consider regulations, an
abstract concept. This has two advantages: it increases the
number of games that the rank will be based on, ensuring
a higher reliability, and it provides a qualitative measure of
the regulation.
What does a low score for a regulation mean? A low score
results from many defeats, meaning that either the regula-
tion (or parts hereof) is easy to implement and therefore
loses against the organisation, or that the tester in question
lacks the skills to detect that an organisation does not im-
plement a regulation correctly. The latter case clearly is not
related to the quality of the regulation. We assume that its
impact will be negligible as different testers investigate its
fulfilment. A high score for a regulation, on the other hand,
means that no or only few organisations have been able or
willing or interested in implementing it. This can either be
on purpose, if designed to distinguish between different levels
of fulfilling a regulation as is the case with ISO 15804 (The
Common Criteria), or it can point at self-contradicting or
nonsensical parts of a regulation.
If one would want to keep the tester in the game, then
another option is to investigate how to realise rankings with
three parties, where tester and regulation are distinguished;
they play on the same side against the organisation, but
have individual rankings, and the regulation’s ranking is in-
fluenced differently by weak or strong testers.
5.2.3 Software Products
The same idea presented in the previous sections can be
applied to estimate severity of software bugs and the re-
silience of software products they are found in. To realise
this, we observe two events that are interpreted as games.
The first event is the detection of a vulnerability. This game
is won by the vulnerability over the software product the vul-
nerability is detected in, and their Elo scores are adjusted
accordingly. The second event is the release of a bug fix.
This game is won by the software product, and again the
Elo scores are adjusted accordingly.
Instead of calculating ratings for individual vulnerabili-
ties, they should be grouped in equivalence classes, where
each class has a score of its own. When more patches against
a vulnerability class become available, its rating will de-
crease. Software products that implement patches against
a class of vulnerabilities at a later point than other prod-
ucts will still win the game against the vulnerability at that
point, but will receive a smaller benefit, due to the already
reduced rating of the vulnerability. Beyond this adaptation
based on Elo scores, one could also add a second discount,
based on how much time has passed since the vulnerability
was detected, either overall, or in the software product in
question.
The interpretation of scores for vulnerabilities is thus their
distribution and yet untreated occurrences. The score for
software products, on the other hand, measures the capa-
bility of its developers to counter and patch detected vul-
nerabilities fast. We are currently studying this particular
example in more detail.
6. REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE
Based on the applications outlined above, we will discuss
the infrastructure that is needed to support a collective ef-
fort in quantifying vulnerability. In particular, this concerns
data availability and the use of the outcomes in risk man-
agement.
6.1 Willingness to Share Incident Data
First and foremost, if organisations are not willing to share
incident data, not even in an anonymised form, then in-
sufficient data will be available to calculate threat ratings
and vulnerability levels. In order to make the Elo approach
work, data on multiple threats against multiple organisa-
tions needs to be available, because the ratings can only be
calculated in comparison. Therefore, more effort is needed
to set up infrastructures for sharing incident data in a secure
way, as well as (legal) incentives to use such infrastructures
in practice. For this to work, sharing needs to be attractive
both from an economic [14, 16, 23] and from a technical [21,
35] perspective.
The data issue is particularly pressing for the malicious
case, where attackers may know about incidents that de-
fenders are not aware of, and defenders may fail to report
incidents to prevent similar attacks. Also, visibility of at-
tacks may be reduced in cases of long-term exploitation
rather than direct attacks, as well as when an attack fails al-
ready in its first stages. The information asymmetry in the
malicious case and associated incentives for reporting need
further study.
6.2 Data on Unsuccessful Threat Events
Secondly, it is not sufficient if only “successful” threats
are reported. If we only obtain data about events where
threat agents are successful, then the threat agents always
win. In that case, there is no way to calculate their threat
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capability. (Threat capabilities will just increase after every
incident, but they will never decrease.) Therefore, organisa-
tions will need to have monitoring systems in place to iden-
tify such unsuccessful threat events, and will need to report
these to the shared infrastructure. This holds for both ac-
cidental threats (storms against power lines) and malicious
threats (cyber attacks). Thus, storms that do not destroy
power lines and attackers that do not break into a system
are essential to provide accurate and comparable ratings for
threat capability and control strength.
6.3 Systematic Testing Efforts
As it may still be difficult to gather accurate operational
data, testing efforts can help to provide input to the models.
Small-scale experiments have been done in which penetra-
tion testers execute multi-step socio-technical attacks [6].
Such experiments could be extended in the context of Item
Response Theory. Again, this will only help in establishing
ratings if multiple threats and multiple organisations are
tested against each other. For penetration testing in the
context of cyber security and privacy, it has already been
proposed to set up a public agency for this purpose [31].
With the current proposal to quantify vulnerability, the im-
portance of such an institution has only increased.
To validate models estimated from data, one would need
to separate training set from test set. This is typically easy
with static ratings (Rasch), as these are calibrated on a
training set by definition, and then used to measure other
entities. For dynamic ratings (Elo), this is more difficult, as
training and testing are combined. One could fix the rat-
ings at a certain point in time, and then measure how well
they perform with different entities. For example, one could
establish Elo ratings for penetration testers based on an ini-
tial set of systems to attack, and then measure whether their
performance on other systems matches their (fixed) rating.
6.4 Vulnerability, Threat Capability, and Risk
Although the main focus of this paper is on expressing
vulnerability, we need to say something at this point on how
to use logistic models of vulnerability in risk assessment. For
reasons of simplicity, we assume that threat events cause
a known amount of damage when “successful” against the
controls, and no damage when unsuccessful.
We assume that risk is defined as the expected damage due
to a specified type of threat within a specified time period.
We then need models to express the following:
1. The damage caused by a successful threat event;
2. The expected number of threat events per time period
(a fixed frequency if constant, or a density function if
variable);
3. The distribution of the threat events over threat ca-
pability levels (relative frequencies for discrete threat
capabilities, or a density function for continuous threat
capabilities);
4. The likelihood of success for threat agents of specified
threat capability (i.e., the logistic vulnerability func-
tion).
These four models can be combined to estimate the ex-
pected level of damage within a given time frame, as they
will provide both the expected frequencies of threat events
of particular capabilities (2 and 3 combined), as well as the
expected damage for a single threat event of particular ca-
pability (1 and 4 combined). In this paper, we assume the
first three models as given, and concentrate on the fourth,
but it is important to have the overall picture in mind to see
how the approach can be applied.
Typically, a countermeasure will reduce the vulnerability
of an asset to a threat. (It may also reduce impact rather
than vulnerability, but that case is not relevant here.) By
implementing countermeasures, one will increase the rating
of the defence (a different type of system will have a dif-
ferent rating), thereby reducing the vulnerability. As the
countermeasure was not present in the system before, the
increased control strength can only be estimated based on
the actual effect of the countermeasure in different systems.
A somewhat ironic observation is that less information may
be available on the best countermeasures, as these measures
may prevent attacks from taking place at all (attackers may
divert their efforts elsewhere).
This is the central explanation that determines how the
Elo-approach accounts for the success of countermeasures.
However, if a countermeasure is added where no attacks are
expected, it still won’t reduce the risk, even if the vulner-
ability is reduced. Therefore, the Elo-rating alone cannot
provide a full risk management approach.
Especially for malicious threats, estimation of threat event
frequencies and associated threat capabilities is a big prob-
lem in itself. Malicious attackers will typically have knowl-
edge of the vulnerability of a system, and adapt their be-
haviour (and therefore the number of threat events and their
threat capability) to this knowledge. We do not address
these issues in this paper.
In future research, we wish to investigate whether the lo-
gistic model can also be applied to represent the damage di-
rectly, i.e., interpreting the result as expected damage rather
than probability of damage.
7. OPEN QUESTIONS
As the proposed approach to quantify vulnerability is new,
there are many open problems to be studied in the research
community. In the following we discuss some open ques-
tions within the proposed research paradigm, based on the
applications outlined above.
7.1 Granularity
As discussed before, the identity of threats and controls is
not as clear-cut as the identity of children and math prob-
lems. Therefore, the definition of populations of threats and
controls is not straightforward. Robust classification ap-
proaches for threats and controls are needed to support lo-
gistic models of vulnerability. These models will most likely
not be based on binary classifications, but rather on similar-
ity measures between entities and their classes. The gran-
ularity of the classes plays an important role here. With
small classes, the measurements are specific, but there are
only few measurements per class, leading to large statisti-
cal uncertainties. Especially if attackers stop their malicious
activities after a single successful (or unsuccessful) attack,
not enough information will be available. With large classes,
there are more measurements per class, but as the classes
are larger, the predictions for future events may not be as
precise. Further research is needed to identify the optimal
population definitions for the application of Item Response
9
Theory to the particular context of security risk manage-
ment.
7.2 Polytomous Rasch Models
The models we discussed assume that there is a binary
variable to express winning or losing a game. In case of
threats, this is not always as obvious as when children try
to solve math problems. Therefore, we need clear definitions
of what it means for a threat to be successful.
A question for further research is whether it is possible to
use a different scale than binary for success. In the standard
Rasch model, failure is represented by 0 and success by 1.
However, threats may inflict different amounts of damage
upon assets, and when the amount of damage is considered,
intermediate values would be needed. For example, the out-
come of a hack may be user access, administrator access,
etc., which can be associated with different success values.
This would lead to a so-called polytomous Rasch model. In
such a model, it can be expressed that threat agents with
lower threat capability will cause lower impact. This sce-
nario would be similar to a child obtaining a lower score on
a math task.
7.3 Mapping Latent Scale and Existing Scales
The models discussed in this paper will produce a latent
scale on which both threat capabilities and control strengths
are rated. In principle, all threats and all controls would
then be rated on the same scale.
However, for particular types of threats, such as storms,
commonly used scales may already exist. For prediction
purposes, it may be useful to map these scales to the latent
scale, for example to predict the effects of a storm with a
particular wind speed. The scales will need to be fitted to
one another to make this possible.
7.4 Graceful Degradation
As discussed before, data is needed to make the approach
work, but getting data on security incidents is not always
easy. When there is a lack of empirical data, can we grace-
fully degrade to other information sources, such as expert
judgement? Can we then use the Rasch model of expert
risk judgement presented in [11] in combination with our
Rasch model of vulnerability? This would allow factoring in
expert judgement where not enough sample data is available,
without relying too much on subjective risk attitudes.
In such a model, there would be three classes of entities:
threat agents (with threat capabilities), controls (with con-
trol strength), and experts (with risk bias). We would want
to estimate all parameters based on actual events, as well as
on judgements of the experts on the vulnerability.
7.5 Multi-Step Attacks
Another important question is how this approach would
work if a malicious attack consists of more than one step,
i.e., a multi-step attack [27]. One would then need to assess
the vulnerability for each of the steps, and for the overall
attacks. Also, the measure of success may be available only
for the attack as a whole, requiring a distribution of the
resulting control strength rating update over the different
components involved, similar to update rules distributing re-
inforcements to the different connections in neural networks.
The threat agent may consist of multiple components too:
multiple attackers may cooperate and perform part of the
steps each. This would require a distribution of the update
on the Threat Capability side as well. Log analysis may be
helpful in judging which steps of an attack have been ex-
ecuted successfully. The success level of an attack (like in
polytomous Rasch models) may then be expressed in terms
of the number of successful steps relative to the total number
of steps (when known).
7.6 Including the Time Factor
For threat events as well as for problem solving, time may
be relevant for judging skills or threat capabilities. If an
attacker with limited computation power takes a week to
crack a password, and an attacker with extensive compu-
tation power achieves the same result in an hour, then we
may want the time to be reflected in the “score”. As the
Math Garden already takes time into account in the update
rules, it may provide inspiration for similar attempts in the
security setting, although the time scales for solving a math
problem are obviously different than for launching a cyber
attack.
One may generalise time spent into a more abstract no-
tion of resources, where skill plus resources would determine
the threat capability of attacks. In this context, resources
can also be seen as an indication of motivation, as more mo-
tivated attackers will spend more resources on an attack.
However, resources spent depend not only on motivation,
but also on the resources available to the attacker. Whether
other relevant aspects of motivation should be included as
well needs to be determined. Also, the relation between re-
sources spent by the attacker and likelihood of success may
be quite different depending on the type of attack, e.g. brute
force password cracking versus picking a lock versus social
engineering. With brute force cracking, more computing
time will lead to a higher chance of success. With lock pick-
ing, skill probably plays a bigger role than time spent, and
with social engineering, spending more time may actually
reduce the likelihood of success, as the activities may raise
suspicion.
7.7 Preventing Arbitrary Rating Fluctuations
In the Math Garden case, it can be reasonably assumed
that there are no rapid major changes in the populations
of children and problems that cause major variations in
the ratings. However, in case of threats, a very successful
virus (say), may suddenly become very unsuccessful after
a patching round. In the hypothetical case that all virus
attacks would be monitored, the first organisations that
the virus would attack after the patch would win against
a very highly ranked opponent (in terms of threat capa-
bility), and would therefore see a major increase in their
control strength. The threat capability of the virus would
decrease accordingly. Consequently, organisations that are
attacked only later would see a smaller increase in their con-
trol strength. This would lead to a rather arbitrary differ-
ence in control strength values among organisations, depend-
ing on the order in which the virus would attack them after
the patching round. This problem could potentially be ad-
dressed by investigating different means of determining the
update (K) factor, for example by employing Kalman filters
[18].
Another issue in this context is how to handle after-the-
fact discovery of an attack. When an attack has already
happened, but has not been identified yet, the rating of a
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system may lag behind with respect to the actual situation.
If the attack is then discovered, it is possible in theory to re-
duce the rating retrospectively. However, this would require
recomputing all ratings, as other ratings may also have been
updated based on the inaccurate rating. This is especially
problematic if ratings would be based on different sources
(e.g. certification versus actual attacks), which is therefore
not recommended.
7.8 Simulations and Experiments
Simulations with artificial input data, based on different
sets of assumptions, can provide additional information on
properties of the models. For example, given the arms race
between attackers and defenders in a malicious context, one
would expect ratings of both attackers and defenders to in-
crease gradually over time. Such hypotheses could be tested
in simulations. Also, simulations allow for sensitivity anal-
ysis, i.e. establishing the sensitivity of vulnerability or risk
values to variations in ratings, or vice versa.
Furthermore, it would be possible to set up experiments
in which hackers play against previously prepared systems
with certain known weaknesses, e.g., virtual machines in the
cloud. Such experiments could provide initial skill levels
(threat capability) of penetration testers, and would also
provide data on how ratings would converge or fluctuate in
practice, depending on different settings of the system. In a
socio-technical setting, the experiments by Dimkov et al. on
laptop theft [6] could serve as an inspiration for evaluat-
ing the approach empirically. However, contrary to these
experiments, penetration testers would need to play multi-
ple scenarios to get meaningful data. In this case, both the
skills of the testers and the quality of the scenarios would
influence success.
7.9 Triangular Games
In this paper, three settings have come up where three
rather than two types of entities interact:
1. An expert (risk bias) predicts the vulnerability of an
asset (control strength) to a threat (threat capability);
2. Auditors / penetration testers (testing skill) judge the
compliance of an organisation (compliance capability)
with a regulation (regulation difficulty).
3. Penetration testers (testing skill) use a scenario (sce-
nario quality) on an organisation (control strength).
In such situations, one would want to estimate all three
latent abilities based on the outcome of events. Typically,
a combination of two of the entities will win or lose against
the third, and update rules should reflect this by distributing
the won/lost rating points over the winning/losing entities.
For example, if a penetration test succeeds, then the combi-
nation of tester and scenario wins against the organisation,
and they should share the points. The right kind of models
(in particular update rules) for such settings still need to
be determined, and simulations should be executed to study
their properties.
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper is part of an initiative to quantify security
risks. We have identified several research topics in this area,
and focused on the question how to measure the vulnera-
bility of a system to a particular threat. Above, we have
discussed an innovative framework to define and measure
this vulnerability, combining the Open Group Risk Taxon-
omy with the Math Garden rating system, based on Item
Response Theory. The approach employs Rasch models and
Elo ratings to quantify vulnerability, which provides a jus-
tifiable relation between threat capability, control strength,
and vulnerability. Furthermore, the explicit calculation of
threat capability and control strength yields the advantage
that predictions can be made about the “success” of future
threat events. This is similar to predicting the success of a
child in solving a math problem, without having solved the
same problem before. We have outlined how this approach
could work in security risk management practices, and we
have identified open problems for future research within this
new framework.
In future work, we will – in addition to the questions
outlined above – deal in more depth with quantification of
threat event frequencies, as well as the aggregation of vul-
nerability to particular threats into an overall measure of
system vulnerability. Combining these ideas, we can ex-
tend the foundations provided by The Open Group into a
complete quantitative security risk management paradigm.
However, the application of Item Response Theory to secu-
rity by itself already provides many new directions of study,
and may inspire both modelling and empirical research in
the field.
Acknowledgements
The research of the first author is supported by financial as-
sistance of the European Commission in the context of the
SESAME project. The views expressed herein are those of
the authors and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect
the official position of the European Commission. The au-
thors wish to thank (in alphabetical order) Raoul Grasman
and Sharon Klinkenberg for a helpful brainstorm session,
and the NSPW participants, the reviewers, and our shep-
herd Rainer Bo¨hme for excellent comments.
9. REFERENCES
[1] R. Anderson and T. Moore. The economics of
information security. Science, 314(5799):610–613,
2006.
[2] A. Birnbaum. Some latent trait models and their use
in inferring an examinee’s ability. In F. M. Lord and
M. R. Novick, editors, Statistical theories of mental
test scores, chapter 17–20, pages 397–479.
Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1968.
[3] S. Bleikertz, M. Schunter, C. W. Probst,
D. Pendarakis, and K. Eriksson. Security audits of
multi-tier virtual infrastructures in public
infrastructure clouds. In Proceedings of the 2010 ACM
workshop on Cloud computing security workshop,
CCSW ’10, pages 93–102, New York, NY, USA, 2010.
ACM.
[4] R. Bo¨hme. A comparison of market approaches to
software vulnerability disclosure. In G. Mu¨ller, editor,
Emerging Trends in Information and Communication
Security, volume 3995 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 298–311. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
2006.
[5] R. Bo¨hme and M. Fe´legyha´zi. Optimal information
security investment with penetration testing. In
11
T. Alpcan, L. Buttya´n, and J. Baras, editors, Decision
and Game Theory for Security, volume 6442 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 21–37. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010.
10.1007/978-3-642-17197-0 2.
[6] T. Dimkov, W. Pieters, and P. H. Hartel. Laptop
theft: a case study on effectiveness of security
mechanisms in open organizations. In Proceedings of
the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security (CCS), Chicago, Illinois,
US, pages 666–668. ACM, October 2010.
[7] T. Dimkov, W. Pieters, and P. H. Hartel. Portunes:
representing attack scenarios spanning through the
physical, digital and social domain. In Proceedings of
the Joint Workshop on Automated Reasoning for
Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of
Security (ARSPA-WITS’10). Revised Selected Papers,
Paphos, Cyprus, volume 6186 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 112–129, Berlin, March 2010.
Springer Verlag.
[8] A. Elo. The rating of Chessplayers, Past and present.
Arco Publishers, New York, 1978.
[9] World football Elo ratings. Available at http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Football_Elo_Ratings.
Last accessed March 2012.
[10] Elo rating system. Available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elo_rating_system.
Last accessed March 2012.
[11] S. Figini, R. S. Kenett, and S. Salini. Optimal scaling
for risk assessment: merging of operational and
financial data. Quality and Reliability Engineering
International, 26(8):887–897, 2010.
[12] D. Florencio and C. Herley. Sex, lies and cyber-crime
surveys. Technical Report MSR-TR-2011-75,
Microsoft Research, June 2011.
[13] S. Foley and W. Fitzgerald. An approach to security
policy configuration using semantic threat graphs. In
Ehud Gudes and Jaideep Vaidya, editors, Data and
Applications Security XXIII, volume 5645 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 33–48. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009.
10.1007/978-3-642-03007-9 3.
[14] E. Gal-Or and A. Ghose. The economic incentives for
sharing security information. Information Systems
Research, 16(2):186–208, 2005.
[15] The Open Group. Risk taxonomy. Technical Report
C081, The Open Group, 2009.
[16] K. Hausken. Information sharing among firms and
cyber attacks. Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy, 26(6):639–688, 2007.
[17] C. Ioannidis, D. Pym, and J. Williams. Information
security trade-offs and optimal patching policies.
European Journal of Operational Research, 216(2):434
– 444, 2012.
[18] R. E. Kalman. A new approach to linear filtering and
prediction problems. Journal of Basic Engineering,
82(1):35–45, 1960.
[19] S. Klinkenberg, M. Straatemeier, and H. L. J. van der
Maas. Computer adaptive practice of maths ability
using a new item response model for on the fly ability
and difficulty estimation. Comput. Educ.,
57:1813–1824, September 2011.
[20] B. Kordy, S. Mauw, S. Radomirovic´, and
P. Schweitzer. Foundations of attack–defense trees. In
Formal Aspects of Security and Trust, 7th
International Workshop, FAST 2010, volume 6561 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 80–95.
Springer, 2011.
[21] P. Lincoln, P. Porras, and V. Shmatikov.
Privacy-preserving sharing and correction of security
alerts. In Proceedings of the 13th conference on
USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13, SSYM’04,
pages 17–17, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2004. USENIX
Association.
[22] B. Littlewood, S. Brocklehurst, N. Fenton, P. Mellor,
S. Page, D. Wright, J. Dobson, J. McDermid, and
Dieter Gollmann. Towards operational measures of
computer security. Journal of Computer Security,
2(2–3):211–229, 1993.
[23] D. Liu, Y. Ji, and V. Mookerjee. Knowledge sharing
and investment decisions in information security.
Decision Support Systems, 52(1):95–107, 2011.
[24] M. S. Lund, B. Solhaug, and K. Stølen. Model-Driven
Risk Analysis: The CORAS Approach. Springer, 2011.
[25] S. Mauw and M. Oostdijk. Foundations of attack trees.
In D. Won and S. Kim, editors, Proc. 8th Annual
International Conference on Information Security and
Cryptology, ICISC’05, volume 3935 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 186–198. Springer, 2006.
[26] P. Mell, K. Scarfone, and S. Romanosky. Common
vulnerability scoring system. Security & Privacy,
IEEE, 4(6):85–89, 2006.
[27] V. Nunes Leal Franqueira, R. H. C. Lopes, and
P. A. T. van Eck. Multi-step attack modelling and
simulation (MsAMS) framework based on mobile
ambients. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing, SAC’2009,
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, pages 66–73, New York,
March 2009. ACM.
[28] J. Pamula, S. Jajodia, P. Ammann, and V. Swarup. A
weakest-adversary security metric for network
configuration security analysis. In Proceedings of the
2nd ACM workshop on Quality of protection, QoP ’06,
pages 31–38, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[29] W. Pieters. Representing humans in system security
models: An actor-network approach. Journal of
Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and
Dependable Applications, 2(1):75–92, 2011.
[30] C. W. Probst and R. R. Hansen. An extensible
analysable system model. Information security
technical report, 13(4):235–246, 2008.
[31] C. W. Probst, M. A. Sasse, W. Pieters, T. Dimkov,
E. Luysterborg, and M. Arnaud. Privacy penetration
testing: How to establish trust in your cloud provider.
In S. Gutwirth, R. Leenes, P. De Hert, and Y. Poullet,
editors, European Data Protection: In Good Health?,
pages 251–265. Springer Netherlands, 2012.
[32] G. Rasch. Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence
and Attainment Tests. MESA Press, 1960.
[33] J. Rowe, K. Levitt, S. Parsons, E. Sklar,
A. Applebaum, and S. Jalal. Argumentation logic to
assist in security administration. In Proceedings of the
2012 New Security Paradigms Workshop (NSPW).
ACM, 2012.
12
[34] B. Schneier. Attack trees: Modeling security threats.
Dr. Dobb’s journal, 24(12):21–29, December 1999.
[35] A. Slagell and W. Yurcik. Sharing computer network
logs for security and privacy: a motivation for new
methodologies of anonymization. In Security and
Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communication
Networks, 2005. Workshop of the 1st International
Conference on, pages 80–89, September 2005.
[36] K. Wauters, P. Desmet, and W. Van Den Noortgate.
Item difficulty estimation: An auspicious collaboration
between data and judgment. Computers & Education,
58:1183–1193, 2012.
[37] M. Yearworth, B. Monahan, and D. Pym. Predictive
modelling for security operations economics. In Proc.
I3P Workshop on the Economics of Securing the
Information Infrastructure, 2006.
13
